Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era

Throughout the past decade, defenders of the U.S. role in Vietnam have argued that America's defeat was not the result of an illegitimate intervention or military shortcomings, but rather a failure of will because national leaders, principally Lyndon B. Johnson, forced the troops to fight with one hand tied behind their backs. In this volume, Robert Buzzanco disproves this theory by demonstrating that political leaders, not the military brass, pressed for war
that American policymakers always understood the problems and peril of war in Indochina
and that civil-military acrimony and the political desire to defer responsibility for Vietnam helped lead the United States into the war. For the first time, these crucial issues of military dissent, interservice rivalries, and civil-military relations and politics have been tied together to provide a cogent and comprehensive analysis of the U.S. role in Vietnam.