Více než 4 miliony titulů v angličtině i dalších jazycích! Objevte svůj nový příběh ještě dnes!

Preemptive Counterproliferation Attack

Name: Preemptive Counterproliferation Attack
Brand: Biblioscholar
SKU: 9781288306152
Price: 369 CZK
Availability: InStock

Comparing Target and Third Party Responses

Autor: William G Eldridge

Jazyk:

Vazba: Brožovaná

Vydavatel: Biblioscholar

Dostupnost: Skladem u dodavatele

Odesíláme za 9-15 dnů

369 Kč

The September 2002 National Security Strategy introduced a policy of preemptive attack to defend aga...

Informace o knize

Autor

William G Eldridge

Jazyk

Angličtina

Vazba

Kniha - Brožovaná

Vydáno

2012

Stránek

EAN

9781288306152

ISBN

9781288306152

Enbook ID

08242540

Vydavatel

Biblioscholar

Hmotnost

168

Rozměry

189 x 246 x 4

Kompletní popis

The September 2002 National Security Strategy introduced a policy of preemptive attack to defend against rogue states and terrorists seeking to acquire and use a nuclear weapon against the United States. This paper examines the effectiveness of a preemptive counterproliferation attack as a means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It argues that a preemptive counterproliferation attack has its greatest coercive effect not on the target state but on third party states. To support this argument, a combination of theory and case study analysis is used to develop a decision-making model. Prospect theory, a decision-making theory under risk, provides the theoretical basis for the model. The model suggests that after a preemptive counterproliferation attack target state leadership will likely increase efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. However, for a variety of reasons some third party nuclear buyer states are likely to offer concessions after observing a preemptive attack against another state. First, if the attack targeted a nuclear rival, then third party states may perceive the attack as a security gain. Second, the attack increases the probability of future attacks against proliferators. Third, the attack may increase the cost of a nuclear program due to the reaction of nuclear arms supplier nations. Two case studies provide evidence for the model. The first case explores the response of Iraq and neighboring Middle Eastern third party states after the 1981 Israeli preemptive attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. The second case investigates the reaction of third party states Libya, Iran, and North Korea to Operation Iraqi Freedom. The paper concludes that a preemptive attack may aid nonproliferation coercion if conducted as part of a broad counterproliferation strategy that includes third party proliferators.