Více než 4 miliony titulů v angličtině i dalších jazycích! Objevte svůj nový příběh ještě dnes!

Rational Inquirer

Name: Rational Inquirer
Brand: Oxford University Press
SKU: 9780198925156
Price: 2472 CZK
Availability: InStock

Disagreement, Evidence, and the Doxastic Attitudes

Autor: Palmira, Michele (Ramon y Cajal Research Fellow, Department of Logic and Theoretical Philosophy, Ramon y Cajal Research Fellow, Department of Logic and Theoretical Philosophy, University of Madrid)

Jazyk:

Vazba: Pevná

Vydavatel: Oxford University Press

Dostupnost: Skladem u dodavatele

Odesíláme za 14-21 dnů

2 472 Kč

The Rational Inquirer offers an original account of the rational response to peer disagreement in te...

Informace o knize

Autor

Palmira, Michele (Ramon y Cajal Research Fellow, Department of Logic and Theoretical Philosophy, Ramon y Cajal Research Fellow, Department of Logic and Theoretical Philosophy, University of Madrid)

Jazyk

Angličtina

Vazba

Kniha - Pevná

Vydáno

2025

Stránek

248

EAN

9780198925156

Enbook ID

48097266

Vydavatel

Oxford University Press

Hmotnost

518

Rozměry

156 x 234

Kompletní popis

The Rational Inquirer offers an original account of the rational response to peer disagreement in terms of a duty to double-check one''s initial conclusions and a permission to retain an inquiry-directing attitude of hypothesis toward those conclusions. This allows for a vindication of the competing rational pressures to revise and retain one''s original views that give rise to the distinctive puzzle of peer disagreement.Michele Palmira conceives of peer disagreement as higher-order evidence that generates a genuine epistemic duty to double-check one''s initial conclusions. His inquiry-theoretic approach contrasts with existing approaches that characterise the rational response to higher-order evidence in terms of doxastic duties to revise or retain one''s beliefs. He develops a pluralist view of the aims of inquiry, offers a definition of double-checking, and defends the genuine epistemic nature of the duty to double-check. Palmira shows that while the duty to double-check is incompatible with rational belief retention, it is compatible with the retention of an attitude of hypothesis whereby two peers retain their cognitive leanings toward conflicting answers to the question at hand. He also contends that hypothesis is a sui generis doxastic attitude that does not reduce to suspended judgement or credences, develops a non-evidentialist and consequentialist view of the central epistemic norm governing rational hypothesis, and argues that the account on offer compares favourably with recent views that also appeal to doxastic attitudes other than belief and suspended judgement.