Angličtina
Limited war and its emphasis on the deliberate limitation of the objectives sought in a conflict differs sharply with its counterpart total war, which demands unlimited objectives. The distinction between these two forms of war can be traced through notable military theorists throughout history, including Carl von Clausewitz and Sir Julian Corbett. The thread common among all the theorists is the understanding that it is the limitation of the objectives, or ends, rather than the limitation of the means applied in waging war, that determines the limited nature of a conflict. United States limited wars in Korea and the Vietnam, as well as conflicts involving other nations, to include China, Israel, reveal common challenges and provide lessons for the implementation of limited war strategies. These include the requirement for clearly articulated political objectives, the communication of those limited objectives to one's adversary, and the need for force structuring to balance limited war and total war capabilities. Limited war is not the only way, but a way to wage modern war. The intent for this paper is to resurrect, or re-introduce, the theory of limited war into discourse concerning United States security policy and military planning at the political and strategic levels. This is necessary not only because of the potential for the United States to be directly involved, but also for the likelihood that conflict between other nations may require the United States to act indirectly with an appreciation of the principles and guidelines for limited war.
