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Wanting and Intending

Name: Wanting and Intending
Brand: Springer
SKU: 9789401773850
Price: 2286 CZK
Availability: InStock

Elements of a Philosophy of Practical Mind

Autor: Neil Roughley

Jazyk:

Vazba: Pevná

Vydavatel: Springer

Dostupnost: Skladem u dodavatele

Odesíláme za 10-13 dnů

2 286 Kč

This book aims to answer two simple questions: what is it to want and what is it to intend? Because...

Informace o knize

Autor

Neil Roughley

Jazyk

Angličtina

Vazba

Kniha - Pevná

Vydáno

2016

Stránek

364

EAN

9789401773850

ISBN

9401773858

Enbook ID

09513328

Vydavatel

Springer

Hmotnost

7037

Rozměry

155 x 235 x 24

Kompletní popis

This book aims to answer two simple questions: what is it to want and what is it to intend? Because of the breadth of contexts in which the relevant phenomena are implicated and the wealth of views that have attempted to account for them, providing the answers is not quite so simple. Doing so requires an examination not only of the relevant philosophical theories and our everyday practices, but also of the rich empirical material that has been provided by work in social and developmental psychology.§§The investigation is carried out in two parts, dedicated to wanting and intending respectively. Wanting is analysed as optative attitudinising, a basic form of subjective standard-setting at the core of compound states such as 'longings', 'desires', 'projects' and 'whims'. The analysis is developed in the context of a discussion of Moore-paradoxicality and deepened through the examination of rival theories, which include functionalist and hedonistic conceptions as well as the guise-of-the-good view and the pure entailment approach, two views popular in moral psychology.§§In the second part of the study, a disjunctive genetic theory of intending is developed, according to which intentions are optative attitudes on which, in one way or another, the mark of deliberation has been conferred. It is this which explains intention's subjection to the requirements of practical rationality. Moreover, unlike wanting, intending turns§out to be dependent on normative features of our life form, in particular on practices of holding responsible.§§The book will be of particular interest to philosophers and psychologists working on motivation, goals, desire, intention, deliberation, decision and practical rationality.§