Angličtina
This monograph analyzes the proposed combat engineer reorganization at division level - E-FORCE - in light of the modern battlefield's requirement for agile combined arms formations. The study first examines the theoretical basis and importance of tactical agility and its implications for the combat engineer. From this discussion three factors - mobility of engineers, capability to alter terrain over time, and command and control - are singled out as the key determinants of the ability of engineers to enhance agility. The monograph assumes that the operations of the U.S. Army's armored divisions in France and Germany during 1944-45 provide appropriate examples of the complexity and intensity of conflict envisioned by AirLand Battle doctrine in FM 100-5. Included in the historical section is a brief account of the engineer experiences of the Germans and Russians on the Eastern Front. As a result of this analysis of engineer operations, several deficiencies in the engineer's ability to enhance tactical agility are presented, most of which were also reported by the Army's official study of its conduct of the Second World War, the General Board. The monograph continues by describing current engineer doctrine and capability to support the agility needs of the Heavy Division and compares it with the previously identified deficiencies in the areas of mobility, capability to alter terrain, and command and control. The organizational changes associated with E-FORCE are seen as significantly improving the combat engineer's ability to speed up the tempo of combined arms operations. The monograph then discusses further enhancements which the author recommends that E-FORCE should adopt in order to achieve the most favorable contribution towards agility. These include greater mobility for specialized engineer equipment, greatly enhanced minefield breaching capability, more extensive intelligence and reconnaissance capability within the E-FORCE S-2 section, improved communication
